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Abstract
Power indices are mappings that quantify the influence of the members of a voting body
on collective decisions a priori. Their nonlinearity and discontinuity makes it difficult
to compute inverse images, i.e., to determine a voting system which induces a power
distribution as close as possible to a desired one. The paper considers approximations to
this inverse problem for the Penrose-Banzhaf index by hill-climbing algorithms and exact
solutions which are obtained by enumeration and integer linear programming techniques.
They are compared to the results of three simple solution heuristics. The heuristics perform
well in absolute terms but can be improved upon very considerably in relative terms. The
findings complement known asymptotic results for large voting bodies and may improve
termination criteria for local search algorithms.
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Penrose limit theorem; Penrose-Banzhaf index; institutional design
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1 Introduction
Collective decision rules and, in particular, heterogeneous voting weights for members of a
committee, council, or shareholder meeting translate into influence on collective decisions in
a nonlinear and even discontinuous fashion. This can be seen, for instance, by considering a
decision quota of q = 50% and players i ∈ N = {1, 2, 3} whose voting weights are given by
either the vector (i) w = (w1, w2, w3) = (33.3¯, 33.3¯, 33.3¯), (ii) w
′ = (50 − ε, 48 + ε, 2), or (iii)
w′′ = (50 + ε, 48 − ε, 2) for small ε > 0. The major weight change from w to w′ does not
affect possibilities to form a winning coalition at all, where coalition S ⊆ N is called winning
if the cumulative weight of its members exceeds the quota. Namely, S is winning if and only if
|S| ≥ 2. By symmetry, the distribution of influence can a priori be expected to equal (13 , 13 , 13 )
for either of the voting systems described by (q;w) and (q;w′). The minor change from w′ to
w′′, in contrast, renders voter 1 a dictator with associated power distribution (1, 0, 0).
Social scientists, philosophers and mathematicians have investigated various voting power
indices which try to quantify the a priori distribution of influence on committee decisions.
The Shapley-Shubik index (Shapley and Shubik 1954) and the Penrose-Banzhaf index (PBI)
(Penrose 1946; Banzhaf 1965) are most prominent, but by far not the only ones.1 They help
researchers clarify the non-trivial a priori power implications of different voting weight assign-
ments to a wider audience. The combinatorial nature of weighted voting systems can easily
mislead the general public’s intuition and even that of political practitioners. For instance, it
was apparently not noted that the voting weights of the original six members of the European
Economic Community, in use from 1958 to 1973, rendered Luxembourg a null player whenever
the EEC Council applied its qualified majority rule, i.e., the country’s vote was irrelevant for
the collective decision. The public discussion – very heated in, but not restricted to, Poland and
Germany – in the wake of the 2007 EU summit at which new voting rules for the EU Council
were agreed reflected persistent confusion between voting weights and power.
Even to specialists, the discrete nature of voting rules still poses challenges. This is true, in
particular, for the optimal design of a voting system. Certain normative desiderata, such as the
equal representation of bottom-tier voters in a two-tier voting system, often call for a specific
distribution of voting power. It is then a non-trivial exercise to find a deterministic voting rule
that comes as close as possible to inducing the desired a priori power distribution.2 Simple hill-
climbing algorithms, such as the ones considered by Laruelle and Widgre´n (1998), Leech (2002a,
2002b, 2003), Aziz, Paterson, and Leech (2007), or Fatima, Wooldridge, and Jennings (2008),
deliver excellent results for many instances of this so-called inverse power index problem but
have rarely been evaluated in a systematic fashion.3 One can neither rule out that only a local
1See Felsenthal and Machover (1998) or Laruelle and Valenciano (2008) for overviews.
2Non-deterministic rules such as random dictatorship or also random quota rules (Dubey and Shapley 1979,
sec. 5) can easily solve the problem, but are generally not regarded as satisfactory.
3We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out to us that Laruelle and Widgre´n (1998, sec. 6) contains
the earliest published specification of an iterative algorithm for solving the inverse problem. This algorithm has
recently been evaluated and improved by de Nijs and Wilmer (2012). Lucas (1992, p. 44) is one of the first to
describe the basic approach to implementing a target PBI vector by a suitable voting rule; while Nurmi (1982,
p. 206f) seems to be the first to state this institutional design problem and to discuss its relevance.
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minimum of the distance between the desired and the induced power vector has been identified.
Nor are bounds known on the possible gap to a globally optimal voting rule. The latter might
involve the intersection of several one-dimensional (q;w)-rules and, therefore, need not even be
a feasible result of the applied search algorithm.
For very big n the distinctions between voting weight and voting power tend to become
negligible under simple majority rule if each voter’s relative weight is small and vanishing in
the limit (and one stays outside a class of somewhat pathological examples).4 Corresponding
asymptotic results for n → ∞ which render the inverse problem trivial have first been sug-
gested in the work of Lionel S. Penrose (1946, 1952). Rigorous investigations of asymptotic
proportionality of voting weight and power, which is often referred to as the Penrose limit theo-
rem, have only more recently been provided by Neyman (1982), Lindner and Machover (2004),
Chang, Chua, and Machover (2006), and Lindner and Owen (2007).
Motivated by qualified majority voting in the EU, S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski (2006, 2007)
have identified an elegant way to approximately solve the inverse problem for n still very
distant from infinity if the decision quota q is a free parameter and all individual voting power
targets are small compared to
√
n times their quadratic mean. Their heuristic suggestion
is particularly appealing because it avoids discrepancies between voting weight and power.
Namely, approximate proportionality between the normalized weight vector w = (w1, . . . , wn)
and the induced PBI B(q;w) is achieved even for n≪∞ when the quota is set to q∗ = 12 (1 +√∑
w2i ). A desired power vector β can hence approximately be induced simply by choosing w =
β and then calculating q∗. Because the rule (q∗;w) is simple and minimizes unwanted confusion
between voting weight and power, it has motivated the prominent “Jagiellonian Compromise”
(also known as double square root voting system) in the discussion of future voting rules for the
EU Council (see, e.g., Kirsch, S lomczyn´ski, and Z˙yczkowski 2007).
Whether the decision quota q is a free parameter, so that S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski’s
optimal q∗ indeed can be chosen, or not, depends on the application at hand. Even if it can,
the lack of bounds on how well the (q∗;β)-heuristic performs relative to the respective globally
optimal solution to the inverse problem provides motivation for further research. Knowing
more about the quality of the (q∗;β)-heuristic is especially important for situations in which
the heuristic can be expected to perform rather badly. Specifically, the derivation of q∗ is based
on a continuous approximation of the fundamentally discrete distribution of the cumulative
weight of a random coalition. Its use is problematic when this approximation is inaccurate.
This pertains particularly – but not exclusively – to “small” voting bodies with few members.
For a given number n of players, the set of different binary voting systems or simple games
is finite. This finiteness entails that many desired power distributions cannot be approximated
too well. Nontrivially, this remains true even for large n: recent results by Alon and Edelman
(2010) imply the existence of sequences of desired power distributions {βn}n=1,2,... which stay
at least a constant positive distance away (in the ‖ · ‖1-norm, which adds up deviations from
target for all voters i = 1, . . . , n) from any Penrose-Banzhaf power distribution.
The finiteness of the set of simple games at the same time suggests a trivial algorithm for
solving the inverse problem: enumerate all systems v with n players, compute the respective
power distribution – say, the PBI B(v) – and then pick a game v∗ that induces the smallest
achievable difference between ideal vector β and B(v) according to a suitable measure of distance
(e.g., the metric induced by a particular vector norm).
To this end, a growing literature has investigated methods for the efficient enumeration
of voting systems (see, e.g., Keijzer 2009; Keijzer, Klos, and Zhang 2010; Kurz 2012a). But,
up to now, even the number of complete simple games (and also of weighted voting games)
is unknown for n > 9. So enumeration works only for voting bodies with very few mem-
bers. Exact solutions to the inverse problem can, fortunately, also be obtained for some-
what larger n by integer linear programming (ILP) techniques. Such an approach was re-
cently presented in Kurz (2012b). It stands in the tradition of earlier applications of ILP to
4The case in which the relative weights of some voters do not vanish as n → ∞ – so that a few large
voters or atomic players stick out in an “ocean” of infinitesimal voters (defining a so-called oceanic game) –
reduces to the analysis of a modified voting body v′ for the PBI. It involves only the atomic voters and a
quota q′ which is obtained from q by subtracting half of the aggregate weight of the infinitesimal voters (see
Dubey and Shapley 1979, sec. 9). If the number of atomic voters is small then the corresponding inverse problem
is exactly of the type investigated here.
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electoral systems, as discussed in Grilli di Cortona, Manzi, Pennisi, Ricca, and Simeone (1999),
Pennisi, Ricca, Serafini, and Simeone (2007) or Ricca, Scozzari, Serafini, and Simeone (2012).
The key idea is to translate the problem of finding a game v whose PBI vector has a distance
no greater than a given value α ≥ 0 from the target vector β into a set of linear inequality
constraints plus the integer requirement that each coalition is either winning or losing, and then
to use efficient ILP solver software in order to check if a solution exists. A bisection process
on α, which consecutively halves the range of tentative optimal values of α that have not yet
been ruled out by the computations, can be stopped after finitely many iterations (namely, once
|αt+1−αt| has fallen below the theoretical minimum distance between any two distinct n-voter
PBI vectors).
This paper draws on complete enumeration, the indicated ILP bisection method, and stan-
dard hill-climbing algorithms in order to evaluate the accuracy of three heuristic solutions to
the inverse problem for the PBI. The first heuristic simply combines w = β with q◦ = 50%; the
second combines it with the “optimal quota” q∗ derived by S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski (2007);
the third uses q¯ = 12 + 1/
√
pin. The latter quota is the average of q∗ computed over a set of
β-vectors which is of particular interest for the egalitarian design of two-tier voting systems
(S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski 2011).
We compute differences between the respective heuristic and exact solutions for three differ-
ent metrics and a comprehensive grid of conceivable target vectors with up to n = 7 voters. We
study rather time-consuming approximations of the exact solutions for a large sample of grid
points for 8 ≤ n ≤ 20 as well as selected real-world examples based on the so-called Penrose
square root rule and EU population figures. The results allow the estimation of bounds for the
accuracy of a heuristic solution and can provide informed termination criteria for conventional
local search algorithms. This may be useful in applications where a specific voting power distri-
bution is sought for a moderate number of council delegates, committee members, or business
shareholders. We also analyze the significant magnitude of relative errors that the mentioned
heuristics can produce even for large n in pathological cases.
In the following Section 2 we first introduce binary voting systems and their basic properties.
The inverse power index problem is then formalized in Section 3, along with a brief discussion
of the worst-case bounds which follow from Alon and Edelman’s (2010) results. In Section 4 we
present the design of our comparative investigation. The corresponding results are the topic of
Section 5. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Binary voting systems
We consider binary voting systems, i.e., each voter i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n} casts a binary vote
(e.g., “yes” or “no”) and this determines a binary collective decision. Such a situation can
mathematically be described by a Boolean function v : 2N → {0, 1}, where 2N denotes the set
of subsets of N . A coalition S ⊆ N can, e.g., be interpreted as the set of “yes”-voters for a
particular (unspecified) proposal.
Definition 1. A simple game is a monotone Boolean function, i.e., a mapping v : 2N → {0, 1}
with v(S) ≤ v(T ) for all S ⊆ T , which additionally satisfies v(∅) = 0, v(N) = 1.
Coalition S ⊆ N is called winning if v(S) = 1, and otherwise losing. S ⊆ N is called a
minimal winning coalition if it is winning and all proper subsets are losing. A simple game
is uniquely characterized by its set of minimal winning coalitions. We refer the reader to
Taylor and Zwicker (1999) for a detailed introduction to simple games.
As illustration consider the simple game v which is characterized by the set
{{1}, {2, 3}} of
its minimal winning coalitions. Taking all supersets of the minimal winning coalitions yields{{1}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 2, 3}, {2, 3}} as the set of all winning coalitions.5 The remaining subsets
are losing.
The monotonicity imposed in Definition 1 is a very weak requirement. By introducing Isbell’s
desirability relation, i.e., i ⊐ j for two voters i, j ∈ N if and only if v({i} ∪ S\{j}) ≥ v(S) is
5All minimal winning and hence all winning coalitions in a proper simple game have non-empty intersection.
So the considered example v is not proper. We do not rule out improper games. They can play a meaningful role
even in majoritarian democratic systems, e.g., if a sufficiently big parliamentary minority can install a special
investigation committee or call for a referendum.
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n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
#S 1 3 8 28 208 16351 >4.7 · 108 >1.3 · 1018 >2.7 · 1036 unknown
#C 1 3 8 25 117 1171 44313 16175188 284432730174 unknown
#W 1 3 8 25 117 1111 29373 2730164 989913344 unknown
Table 1: Number of distinct simple games, complete simple games, and weighted voting games
satisfied for all {j} ⊆ S ⊆ N\{i} (see, e.g., Isbell 1956), one can define a particularly relevant
subclass of the set of all simple games S:
Definition 2. A simple game v is called complete (also called directed) if the binary relation
⊐ is a total preoder, i.e.,
(1) i ⊐ i for all i ∈ N ,
(2) i ⊐ j or j ⊐ i (including “i ⊐ j and j ⊐ i”) for all i, j ∈ N , and
(3) i ⊐ j, j ⊐ h implies i ⊐ h for all i, j, h ∈ N .
In our small example one can easily check that 1 ⊐ 2 ⊐ 3. So v ∈ C where C ⊂ S denotes
the set of all complete simple games. Note that also 3 ⊐ 2, i.e., voters 2 and 3 are equally
desirable.
Many binary voting systems which are used in practice belong to a further refinement of S:
Definition 3. A simple game v is weighted if there exist non-negative weights wi ∈ R≥0 and
a positive quota q ∈ R>0 such that v(S) = 1 if and only if
∑
i∈S wi ≥ q.
A weighted representation of our small illustrative example is given by (q;w) = [2; 2, 1, 1].
We call weighted simple games weighted voting games and denote their collection by W . Every
weighted voting game is complete while not every complete simple game is weighted, i.e.,
W ⊂ C ⊂ S.6 The presently known enumeration results for the three considered classes of
binary voting systems are summarized in Table 1 (up to isomorphisms). See, e.g., Kurz (2012a)
for details.
There are several equivalent representations of binary voting structures besides Boolean
functions and lists of minimum winning coalitions. Simple games can, for instance, be described
as independent sets in a graph, and Carreras and Freixas (1996) have introduced a very efficient
matrix parameterization of C. Our computation algorithms will exploit yet another possibility.
Namely, we use that voting systems can be represented as points of a polyhedron which have
integer coordinates only: for each S ⊆ N define 0 ≤ xS ≤ 1 and add the constraints x∅ = 0,
xN = 1, and xS ≤ xT for all ∅ ⊆ S ⊂ T ⊆ N . Each integer solution (x∅, x{1}, . . . , xN ) ∈ {0, 1}2n
of this system of linear inequalities corresponds one-to-one to a simple game (with v(S) = xS).
Complete simple games and weighted voting games are described by additional constraints and
auxiliary variables wi ∈ R≥0 for the weights. For instance, the inequality
w(S) =
∑
i∈S
wi ≤ q − 1 +M · xS (1)
implies that the sum of weights of a coalition S is at most q−1 if coalition S is losing, i.e., xS = 0.
For a sufficiently large M , which can be computed explicitly, inequality (1) is automatically
satisfied for xS = 1. Similarly the constraint∑
i∈S
wi ≥ q +M(1− xS) (2)
forces winning coalitions to have a weight sum exceeding or meeting the quota. Because each
weighted voting game admits a representation (q;w1, . . . , wn) where w(S) ≤ w(T ) − 1 for all
losing coalitions S and all winning coalitions T , inequalities (1) and (2) capture the weightedness
requirement for a simple game described by (x∅, x{1}, . . . , xN ).
6But each complete simple game and even each simple game can be represented as the intersection of
1 ≤ k <∞ weighted voting games. The minimal number k of weighted voting games is called the dimension of
the simple game in question (see, e.g., Taylor and Zwicker 1999, De˘ıneko and Woeginger 2006).
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3 The inverse power index problem
Power indices are mappings from a set of feasible voting structures, such as S or W , to non-
negative real vectors which are meant to quantify the influence of the members of a voting body
on collective decisions. The inverse power index problem consists in finding a voting system,
e.g., (q;w) ∈ W , which induces a power distribution as close as possible to a desired one. More
formally, for a given number n of voters, the general inverse power index problem involves a
set Γ of feasible voting structures for n players, a power index φ : Γ → Rn≥0, a desired power
distribution β ∈ Rn≥0, and a metric d : Rn × Rn → R≥0 which measures the deviation between
two power vectors. Of course, d(x, y) = ‖x− y‖ is a suitable choice for any vector norm ‖ · ‖.
Given these ingredients the inverse power index problem amounts to finding a solution to the
minimization problem
min
v∈Γ
d
(
φ(v), β
)
. (3)
In this paper, we consider the special instances of this problem where Γ ∈ {S, C,W}. We
include S and C because they are significantly larger domains for n ≥ 5 (see Table 1) and some
prominent real-world electoral systems fail to correspond to weighted voting games. Examples
include the current voting rules (Treaty of Nice) and the future ones (Treaty of Lisbon) for the
EU Council, which require majorities in more than one dimension (e.g., the Nice rules call for
255 out of 345 votes, 14 out of 27 member states, and 62% of EU population). We take the
(normalized) Penrose-Banzhaf index B(v) as the voting power index of interest.
Definition 4. For a given n-player simple game v the absolute Penrose-Banzhaf index B′i(v)
for player i is defined as
B′i(v) =
1
2n−1
·
∑
∅⊆S⊆N\{i}
v(S ∪ {i})− v(S).
The (normalized) Penrose-Banzhaf index (PBI) Bi(v) for player i is defined as
Bi(v) =
B′i(v)∑n
j=1 B
′
j(v)
.
Our distance computations will be based on the ‖ · ‖1-norm (i.e., the sum of deviations
between Bi(v) and βi for all players i), the ‖ · ‖∞-norm (i.e., the maximum deviation), and a
weighted version of the former. Section 4 will provide more details.
To the best of our knowledge, there exists only one (non-trivial) non-approximative result
on how well the inverse problem can be solved for the PBI in the worst case. For completeness
and later reference we include this rather recent finding by Alon and Edelman (2010) here.
It considers a given game v with n players in which 1 − ε of the total (normalized) PBI is
concentrated amongst k < n “major” players. Alon and Edelman then provide a construction
for a game v˜ such that the worth v˜(S) of a coalition S depends only on T = S ∩{1, . . . , k}, i.e.,
the subset of major players in S fully determines whether S is winning in game v˜ or not.7 One
can easily observe that v˜ is a simple game and Bi(v˜) = 0 for all i > k.
8 The essential finding
of Alon and Edelman then is that the deviation ‖B(v) − B(v˜)‖1 is bounded from above by a
function which depends on ε and the number k of major players only. Considering the k-player
simple game v′, which arises from v˜ by removing the n − k null players, their result can be
stated as follows:
Theorem 1 (Alon-Edelman). Consider the simple game v with players N = {1, . . . , k, . . . , n}
and 0 < ε < 1
k+1 . If
∑n
i=k+1 Bi(v) ≤ ε, then there exists a simple game v′ with k voters such
that
k∑
i=1
|Bi(v) −Bi(v′)| +
n∑
i=k+1
Bi(v) ≤ (2k + 1)ε
1− (k + 1)ε + ε.
7Specifically, one sets v˜(S) = 1 if and only if
∑
U⊆{k+1,...,n} v(T ∪ U) ≥ 2
n−k
2
. So the coalition T of major
players – and hence all supersets S′ = T ∪ U that are obtained by adding different coalitions U of “minor”
players – is winning in v˜ if and only if a majority of the latter coalitions S′ are winning in v.
8Moreover, we have v˜ ∈ C if v ∈ C and v˜ ∈ W if v ∈ W , i.e., the construction respects completeness or
weightedness of the simple game in question.
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This result is very useful for obtaining lower bounds on distances in the context of the
inverse problem because one may suitably reduce the problem from n to k players and only
make an error with the indicated bound. Specifically, let β = (β1, . . . , βn) be a desired power
distribution and k, ε be constants satisfying 0 < ε < 1
k+1 . Let us denote the unknown n-player
simple game whose PBI has smallest distance to β by v∗. One can then bound ‖B(v∗) − β‖1
by distinguishing two cases.
First, suppose that
∑n
i=k+1 Bi(v
∗) ≥ ε. In this case, we can only apply Theorem 1 if the
inequality happens to be tight. However, we know that the deviations between Bi(v
∗) and βi
for players k + 1, . . . , n are at least as big as
∣∣ n∑
i=k+1
Bi(v
∗)−
n∑
i=k+1
βi
∣∣.
This can range from 1−∑ni=k+1 βi when∑ni=k+1 Bi(v∗) = 1 to |ε−∑ni=k+1 βi| when∑ni=k+1 Bi(v∗)
= ε in the considered case. Analogous reasoning applies to the additional deviations for players
1, . . . , k, and we thus have the bound
‖B(v∗)− β‖1 ≥ min
1≥x≥ε
∣∣1− x− k∑
i=1
βi
∣∣+ ∣∣x− n∑
i=k+1
βi
∣∣ =: l1.
In the second case, i.e., when
∑n
i=k+1 Bi(v
∗) < ε, Theorem 1 applies. It tells us that there
exists some k-player simple game v′ with
k∑
i=1
|Bi(v∗)−Bi(v′)| +
n∑
i=k+1
|Bi(v∗)− 0| ≤ (2k + 1)ε
1− (k + 1)ε + ε.
If we use v˜ to denote the n-player game that extends v′ by adding k + 1, . . . , n as null players
(so that B(v˜) = (B1(v
′), . . . , Bk(v
′), 0, . . . , 0)), this can also be written as
‖B(v∗)−B(v˜)‖1 ≤ (2k + 1)ε
1− (k + 1)ε + ε. (4)
Now if we solve the k-player inverse problem for the (typically non-normalized) k-vector β′ =
(β1, . . . , βk) which coincides with the first k components of β, then the resulting minimal dis-
tance ε′ is a lower bound for the distance between B(v˜) and β, i.e.,
‖B(v˜)− β‖1 ≥ ε′. (5)
We can then appeal to the triangle inequality for metric d1(x, y) = ‖x− y‖1 and conclude
‖B(v∗)− β‖1 ≥ ‖B(v˜)− β‖1 − ‖B(v˜)−B(v∗)‖1 ≥ ε′ − (2k + 1)ε
1− (k + 1)ε + ε := l2
from (4) and (5). Thus, in either of the two cases we have ‖B(v∗)− β‖1 ≥ min(l1, l2).
Let us illustrate this by an example and suppose that one seeks to find a voting game with
a power distribution as close as possible to βn = (0.75, 0.25, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Rn≥0 for n ≥ 2. We will
show ‖B(v) − βn‖1 ≥ 19 for all n-player simple games v.9 To this end we choose k = 2 and
ε = 118 . If
∑n
i=3Bi(v
∗) ≥ ε for the unknown distance-minimizing game v∗ then we have
min
1≥x≥ε
∣∣1− x− k∑
i=1
βi
∣∣+ ∣∣x− n∑
i=k+1
βi
∣∣ = min
1≥x≥ε
2x = 2ε =
1
9
.
9Such artificially constructed target vectors βn, for which Alon and Edelman’s results have bite, may not
be of much practical relevance. But they indicate the problems of requiring any fixed level of accuracy in the
stopping rule of a local search algorithm. Moreover, one can conceive of real-world enterprises in which the
majority and minority partners indeed seek to split voting power 3 : 1 and want to render all n − 2 other
stakeholders null players.
7
So in this case we have ‖B(v∗) − βn‖1 ≥ 19 . In the other case of
∑n
i=3 Bi(v
∗) < ε, we solve
the inverse power index problem for k = 2 players and β′ = β2 = (0.75, 0.25). Since the only
possible 2-player PBI vectors are given by
{
(1, 0), (12 ,
1
2 ), (0, 1)
}
we have a minimal deviation
of ε′ = 12 . Because
(2k+1)ε
1−(k+1)ε + ε =
7
18 we have l2 =
1
9 and again conclude ‖B(v∗) − βn‖1 ≥ 19 .
Hence, βn cannot be approximated by the PBI of a simple game with an ‖ · ‖1-error less than
1
9 . The latter is the sharpest possible bound obtainable from Theorem 1. It can be improved
computationally to slightly more than 1437 for n ≤ 11 on S and for n ≤ 16 on C and W (see
Kurz 2012b).
4 Design of the computational investigation
When the inverse problem arises in political applications of constitutional design, PBI vectors
β which are proportional to the square root of a population size vector p play an elevated role.
The reason is that – under the probabilistic assumptions which underlie the PBI – a binary
voting system v with B(v) = β and
βi =
√
pi∑n
j=1
√
pj
(6)
would equalize the voting power of citizens in a two-tier system in which n delegates adopt
the bottom-tier majority opinion of their respective constituency i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and then
cast a wi-weighted vote in a top-tier assembly (e.g., the EU Council). See Penrose (1946),
Felsenthal and Machover (1998), Kaniovski (2008) or Kurz, Maaser, and Napel (2012) for de-
tails. In our computations we will consider this Penrose square root rule for varying n and some
historical population figures in order to select target vector examples which have a specific po-
litical motivation.
In principle, however, any vector in Rn≥0 whose entries sum up to 1 might be a desired
power distribution β. For instance, partners of a non-profit R&D joint venture might have
made relative financial contributions of
(
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
9 ,
1
9 ,
1
9
)
and possibly want to align a priori voting
power in the directorate to this vector as well as possible. Ideally, for a given number n of
voters, one would like to compare the exact and heuristic solutions to the inverse problem
for all possible normalized target vectors β ∈ ∆(n − 1), where ∆(n − 1) denotes the n − 1-
dimensional unit simplex. This is computationally infeasible. We, however, complement our
analysis of politically motivated square root vectors by vectors β from a discrete subset of
∆(n−1), namely a finite grid on ∆(n−1) with step size 0.01. We also resort to approximations
of the exact solution when n is too large.
We will compare the (approximated) exact solution of the inverse problem on domain S, C,
or W for a given desired PBI β with three different heuristics. These stay in the class W of
weighted voting games and have in common that voting weights are set equal to the desired
voting power, i.e., w = β. They pick a distinct quota, and hence typically a different voting
system v ∈ W .
The first heuristic – referred to as the 50%-heuristic – just chooses q◦ = 12 . Simple majority
is arguably the most common majority rule in practice. The 50%-heuristic simply picks it and
ignores the potentially large discrepancies between voting weight and voting power that can
arise. This can be motivated by the Penrose limit theorem when n is at least moderately big
(see fn. 4 however).
The second, more sophisticated heuristic has been suggested by S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski
(2006, 2007). Their motivation was to implement PBI vectors proportional to the square root
of population sizes in the European Union, but the heuristic applies to arbitrary target vectors.
Namely, the q∗-heuristic selects the quota
q∗ =
1
2
·
(
1 +
√∑
i
w2i
)
for an arbitrary w = β ∈ ∆(n − 1). S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski (2007) derive this quota by
considering the random weightW which is accumulated if all coalitions S ⊆ N are equiprobable,
as the PBI’s probabilistic justifications suppose. Equiprobability at the level of coalitions is
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equivalent to assuming that each voter i ∈ {1, . . . , n} joins the formed coalition independently
of the others with probability 12 . The mean ofW hence is µ =
∑n
i=1
1
2wi =
1
2 and its variance is
σ2 = 14
∑n
i=1 w
2
i . Being the sum of independent bounded random variables,W is approximately
normally distributed if n is sufficiently large and each of the weights is sufficiently small.10
Assuming that this is the case and, therefore, that the discrete random variable W can be
replaced by the continuous one W˜ , the inflection point of the corresponding normal density of
W˜ is located at q∗ = µ + σ. Since the second derivative of W˜ ’s density vanishes at q∗, one
can approximate the density by a linear function with reasonably high accuracy. This linear
approximation then allows to establish approximate proportionality of B(q∗;w) and w. We
refer to S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski (2007) for details.
Our final heuristic, which we will refer to as the q¯-heuristic, replaces q∗ by
q¯ =
1
2
+
1√
pin
.
This quota approximates the expected value of q∗ when β is proportional to the component-wise
square root of a population size vector p = (p1, . . . , pn) which is drawn from a flat Dirichlet
distribution (see S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski 2011). The motivation for computing such an
average is the following: even though the q∗-heuristic can approximate the Penrose square
root rule (6) very transparently for a given population distribution p, frequent changes in the
population would call not only for frequent changes of the prescribed voting weights w but
also of the quota q∗. That current voting weights in the EU already recur to population
figures, which are updated on an annual basis, suggests that weight changes may be regarded
as unproblematic. A varying decision threshold – perhaps q = 65% in one year, q′ = 61% in the
next, then q′′ = 67%, etc. – however seems politically less palatable. It may then make sense
to average q∗ over a wide range of values for w = β ∝ √p, and the q¯-heuristic simply assumes
that all population distributions p ∈ ∆(n − 1) are equally likely.11 Because q¯ → 12 as n → ∞,
the 50%-heuristic is the limit of the q¯-heuristic and can be viewed as an approximation of it for
not too small n.
Let us remark that investigations by Kurth (2008) have called attention to numerical prob-
lems when heuristics which involve irrational voting weights and quotas, as the q∗ or q¯-heuristics
commonly do, are implemented. Rounding after, e.g., 4 decimal places can result in voting sys-
tems which differ significantly from what was intended. Because it is impractical to deal with
weights of a hundred decimal places or more, it is attractive to work with the underlying Boolean
functions or integer points of a suitable polyhedron as long as possible, and to determine mini-
mal integer weights w and a quota q which efficiently represent a given v ∈ W when needed.12
We use this approach here whenever possible, and refer the interested reader to Freixas and
Molinero (2009, 2010), Freixas and Kurz (2011), or Kurz (2012a).
We calculate the globally optimal solution to the inverse problem for a given target PBI β
by complete enumeration of the elements in the respective class of binary voting systems for
n ≤ 7 (see Table 1). For larger n, we mostly focus on approximations of the exact solution.
These are obtained either by a hill-climbing algorithm or, preferably, by ILP techniques. How
the latter are used is explained in the Appendix in detail. The implemented ILP-based bisection
algorithm would yield globally optimal solutions when given enough running time and memory.
We interrupted it for efficiency reasons whenever a desired precision had been reached. The key
idea of the ILP-based approach is to consider the integer polyhedron which contains all simple
games whose PBI is less than a given factor α > 0 away from the desired vector β. It can be
checked by using readily available ILP solver software if this polyhedron is empty. Then, no
such game exists and α needs to be raised. If not, α can be lowered. The minimal level of α (or
an approximation with desired precision) together with the corresponding voting systems, can
10A key technical requirement is that wj ≪
√∑
w2i for all j ∈ N , i.e., wj
√
n is sufficiently smaller than the
quadratic mean of the weights
√
1
n
∑
w2i .
11The expected value of the p-specific optimal quotas q∗(p) for a particular (e.g., Dirichlet) distribution
of p, of course, need not coincide with the quota that is optimal when p is treated as a random variable.
Stochastic optimization techniques are likely to yield a somewhat better q-heuristic than the one suggested by
S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski (2011).
12A minimal integer representation of a weighted voting game has the advantage that the PBI and other
power indices can be computed particularly quickly.
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thus be found by the bisection method: namely, by iteratively halving the interval defined by
the best lower and upper bounds that have been computed so far. Pseudo-code of the algorithm
is provided in Appendix A.
In evaluating the quality of the mentioned heuristics, we consider distances to the desired
power vector, β, and to the globally optimal one, B(v∗), in three different metrics. The first
one is the metric d1(x, y) = ‖x− y‖1 =
∑n
i=1 |xi − yi| induced by the ‖ · ‖1-norm, which is also
considered in Theorem 1. The second is the metric induced by the ‖ · ‖∞-norm, i.e., d∞(x, y) =
‖x−y‖∞ = maxi∈{1,...,n} |xi−yi|. We refrain from also considering the Euclidean metric induced
by the ‖ · ‖2-norm, which has been considered, e.g., by S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski (2007).
The reason is that this would turn the ILP formulation of the inverse power index problem
into a binary non-linear programming one. This would be considerably harder to solve and add
relatively little information because ‖x‖∞ ≤ ‖x‖2 ≤
√
n‖x‖∞ for all x ∈ Rn.
More interesting, in our view, is a variation of d1 which takes the Bernoulli model that under-
lies the PBI and Penrose’s square root rule seriously. This model assumes that all bottom-tier
voters in constituency i ∈ {1, . . . , n} cast a “yes” or “no” vote equiprobably and independently
of all others. The probability for one of pi individual voters in constituency i to be pivotal for
the constituency’s aggregate decision – i.e., to induce the i-delegate at the top-tier council to
cast voting weight wi in favor of “yes” by individually voting “yes”, and “no” by voting “no” –
is approximately
√
2/(pipi). The joint probability of a given voter being pivotal in his or her
constituency i and of this constituency being pivotal at the top tier is hence Bi(v) ·
√
2/(pipi).
This is why the square root PBI vector in equation (6) equalizes the indirect influence of citizens
on collective decisions across constituencies. If one now weights any deviation between (i) the
probability for a given voter in constituency i to be doubly pivotal and (ii) the egalitarian ideal
of βi ·
√
2/(pipi) with βi =
√
pi/
∑n
j=1
√
pj equally, then the total misrepresentation associated
with the top-tier voting system v amounts to
n∑
i=1
pi ·
∣∣βi −Bi(v)∣∣ ·√2/(pipi) = c · n∑
i=1
√
pi ·
∣∣βi −Bi(v)∣∣
for c > 0. Whenever the desired vector β is derived from Penrose’s square root rule and a
vector p which represents EU population data, we will, therefore, also consider the variation
of metric d1 which weights absolute deviations by the square root of relative population, i.e.,
study the metric13
d′1(x, y) =
n∑
i=1
√
pi∑n
j=1 pj
· |xi − yi|.
5 Computational results
In this section we present our numerical results. Subsection 5.1 considers the EU Council of
Ministers as a prototype of a real-world weighted voting system. We then look at the entire
discretized space of possible power distributions for n ≤ 7 and random samples thereof in Sub-
section 5.2. In order to study analytically how deviations between simple heuristics and actual
optimization depend on n, we investigate a particular parametric example in Subsection 5.3.
Exact solutions to the inverse power index problem that are reported in Tables 2–4 have
been obtained using our ILP-based bisection algorithm, as described above and in Appendix A.
For Table 5 we have used exhaustive enumeration of all possible Banzhaf vectors for n ≤ 7,
and resorted to approximations obtained by hill-climbing algorithms for 8 ≤ n ≤ 20. The
bisection part of the ILP approach was implemented in C++ while we used the ILOG CPLEX
Interactive Optimizer 12.4.0.0 in order to solve individual integer linear programming problems.
The hill-climbing algorithms used in Subsection 5.2 were implemented in C++. We employed a
Quad-Core AMD Opteron processor with 2700 Mhz, 132 GB RAM, and a cache size of 512 KB
on a 64-bit Linux system as our hardware.
13Consideration of a similar variation of d∞ broadly confirms the comparisons based on d1, d′1, and d∞.
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5.1 Examples of real-world weighted voting systems
We first consider the (EEC or EC or) EU Council of Ministers in the years 1958, 1973, 1981,
1986, 1995, 2006, and 2011 with respectively n ∈ {6, 9, 10, 12, 15, 25, 27}members as examples.
The historical population data for n ∈ {6, . . . , 15} are taken from Felsenthal and Machover (1998,
sec. 5.3), the data for n ∈ {25, 27} are official Eurostat figures downloaded on 19.01.2012. The
target power distributions β are the respective “fair” ones computed by Penrose’s square root
rule (see equation (6)).
In Tables 2–4 we compare the three considered heuristics under different metrics with the
(approximated) optimal solution of the inverse power index problem. We distinguish between S,
C, andW as the sets of admissible voting structures. Besides the absolute deviations (measured
in the respective metric) we also report an indicator of relative quality: if the distance between
β and the PBI B(v∗) of the optimal solution v∗ ∈ S is α, then this is the unavoidable absolute
“error” associated with the given instance of the inverse problem. Now if a certain heuristic
delivers a distance of δ then (δ − α)/α can be regarded as the avoidable error relative to global
optimization in S. It is labeled S-error in the tables. A value of 1 (or 100%) means that the
heuristic’s approximation error is twice the unavoidable one.
The “†”-symbol indicates that the stated value in Tables 2–4 has not been computationally
proven to be optimal: for simple games and n = 9, for instance, we stopped the ILP solution
process after memory usage of 31 GB and 18461700 branch-and-bound nodes; for n = 10, we
interrupted after 301 GB and 16735508 nodes. The “††”-symbol indicates that a lower bound
for the minimal distance in S or C was inferred fromW . The “††”-marked numbers need not be
optimal a fortiori. The “∞” entries indicate avoidable errors greater than factor 500. Finally,
0.000000† or 0.000000†† represent positive numbers < 0.5 · 10−6.
The computation times for obtaining the numbers in the C-column in Table 2, using the
hardware and software described above, ranged from less than a second for n = 6 to 5 days for
n = 12. The exact solution for n = 10 in W took 2 days; the approximate one for n = 27 was
obtained in 3 hours.14
v∗ ∈ S v∗∗ ∈ C v∗∗∗ ∈ W 50%-heuristic q∗-heuristic q¯-heuristic
n d1 d1 d1 d1 S-error d1 S-error d1 S-error
6 0.051857 0.051857 0.051857 0.300398 4.79 0.091100 0.76 0.091100 0.76
9 0.005294† 0.008641 0.010359 0.065528 11.38 0.060195 10.37 0.069792 12.18
10 0.002639† 0.004840 0.007219 0.038751 13.68 0.033229 11.59 0.026466 9.03
12 0.001033† 0.001033† 0.005170† 0.028700 26.78 0.019827 18.19 0.019827 18.19
15 0.000476†† 0.000476†† 0.000476† 0.026742 55.18 0.006820 13.33 0.006361 12.36
25 0.000000†† 0.000000†† 0.000000† 0.019422 “∞” 0.000744 “∞” 0.003096 “∞”
27 0.000000†† 0.000000†† 0.000000† 0.018003 “∞” 0.000633 “∞” 0.002457 “∞”
Table 2: Performance for Penrose square root targets in the d1-metric (1958–2011 EU data)
The reported numbers give rise to several observations that are independent of the chosen
metric:15 (i) The approximation errors of the heuristics and the optimal solutions in W (and
a fortiori in C and S) tend to zero as n increases. (ii) Except for n = 9, the q∗- and the
q¯-heuristics perform noticeably better than the 50%-heuristic. (iii) The q∗ and q¯-heuristics
produce comparable absolute deviations from the ideal for n ≤ 15 but differ by a factor of 2
or more for n > 15. We conjecture that this has to do with the normal density approximation,
which is underlying S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski’s (2007) derivation of q∗, becoming noticeably
more accurate for the population distribution in the enlarged EU. This allows q∗’s performance
to improve by almost an order of magnitude between n = 15 and 25, while performance of the
14The additional constraints (1) and (2) which ensure v’s weightedness in our ILP formulation consider-
ably slow down the computations (because the so-called integrality gap increases). In contrast, the analogous
constraints which ensure completeness impose useful structure on the problem compared to unrestrained opti-
mization in S. This explains, e.g., why an exact solution can be reported for n = 10 in Table 4 in the C-column
but not in the S and W-columns.
15Note that the three metrics behave differently when, e.g., distance between (1, 0, . . . , 0) and ( 1
n
, . . . , 1
n
) ∈
∆(n− 1) is considered for increasing n. Deviations should, therefore, be compared only within and not across
tables.
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v∗ ∈ S v∗∗ ∈ C v∗∗∗ ∈ W 50%-heuristic q∗-heuristic q¯-heuristic
n d′1 d
′
1 d
′
1 d
′
1 S-error d′1 S-error d′1 S-error
6 0.018967 0.021487 0.021487 0.110284 4.81 0.027465 0.45 0.027465 0.45
9 0.001902† 0.002752 0.003513 0.019015 9.00 0.018935 8.96 0.017643 8.28
10 0.000803† 0.001442 0.001909† 0.008893 10.07 0.007325 8.12 0.005489 5.84
12 0.000309† 0.000447† 0.000810† 0.007840 24.37 0.004005 11.96 0.004005 11.96
15 0.000152†† 0.000152†† 0.000152† 0.007790 50.26 0.001230 7.09 0.001554 9.23
25 0.000000†† 0.000000†† 0.000000† 0.004874 “∞” 0.000213 “∞” 0.000751 “∞”
27 0.000000†† 0.000000†† 0.000000† 0.004411 “∞” 0.000176 “∞” 0.000578 “∞”
Table 3: Performance for Penrose square root targets in the d′1-metric (1958–2011 EU data)
v∗ ∈ S v∗∗ ∈ C v∗∗∗ ∈ W 50%-heuristic q∗-heuristic q¯-heuristic
n d∞ d∞ d∞ d∞ S-error d∞ S-error d∞ S-error
6 0.014948 0.014948 0.014948 0.082758 4.54 0.032728 1.19 0.032728 1.19
9 0.001498† 0.001840 0.002240 0.019238 11.84 0.015909 9.62 0.023179 14.47
10 0.000575† 0.001211 0.001960† 0.011574 19.13 0.006316 9.98 0.009721 15.91
12 0.000229† 0.000138† 0.000865† 0.007940 33.67 0.005756 24.13 0.005756 24.13
15 0.000066†† 0.000066†† 0.000066† 0.005923 88.74 0.001798 26.24 0.001202 17.21
25 0.000000†† 0.000000†† 0.000000† 0.003834 “∞” 0.000173 “∞” 0.000384 “∞”
27 0.000000†† 0.000000†† 0.000000† 0.003434 “∞” 0.000156 “∞” 0.000277 “∞”
Table 4: Performance for Penrose square root targets in the d∞-metric (1958–2011 EU data)
q¯-heuristic (which ignores the specific population distribution at hand and picks the optimal
quota averaged over many possible distributions) improves only by about the same factor as
the 50%-heuristic and thus in line with the asymptotic proportionality results captured by the
Penrose limit theorem.
We also find that (iv) the respective optimal weighted games v∗∗∗ ∈ W yield deviations that
are only moderately higher than those of v∗ ∈ S in absolute terms. This might be interpreted
as indicating that relatively little is lost by restricting attention to weighted voting games in
conventional hill-climbing algorithms. It should be noted, however, that we could not prove
optimality in S for n ≥ 9, and for n ≥ 15 we only have upper bounds obtained from W . So the
observation might not be very robust. And, in relative terms, the errors in S or C are several
times smaller than those in W for n = 10 or 12.
Finally, (v) the relative errors of the heuristics compared to either v∗ ∈ S or v∗∗∗ ∈ W
are sizeable even for small n ≤ 15; and they become huge for n > 25. For small n like n = 6
or 9, the unavoidable error, i.e., the distance between B(v∗) and the target vector β, is still
big because comparatively few distinct PBI values exist. At the same time, such numbers n
are far too small for the normal approximation which underlies the q∗ and q¯-heuristics or for
the asymptotics which motivate the 50%-heuristic to have leverage. So the heuristics do not
perform well in absolute terms, but they are not that bad in relative terms because of high
unavoidable errors. Now as n increases, the heuristics perform significantly better in absolute
terms. However, the unavoidable error vanishes even more quickly as the number of distinct
simple voting games and, hence, of feasible PBI vectors increases very fast in n (see Table 1).
Observation (v) is probably the most interesting: whenever one seeks an optimal solution of
the inverse power index problem, all three heuristics are unsatisfactory from a pure operations
research perspective. The heuristic solutions can be improved by very large factors, and this
becomes more rather than less pronounced as n grows. Of course, from an applied point of
view the absolute approximation errors get so small for large n that they may be regarded
as negligible. They might still be relevant, however. To get a sense for what a deviation at
the 5th decimal place means consider, e.g., the ideal Penrose square root power distribution
β27 for the EU Council from 2011 and compute the analogous vector β27′ which would result
if 50000 people moved from Germany to France or were mis-counted in the statistics. Then
‖β27 − β27′‖1 ≈ 0.0000634.
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5.2 Finite grid of objective vectors
Every vector in Rn≥0 whose entries sum to 1, i.e., each element of ∆(n−1), can in principle be a
desired power distribution in a specific context. We approximate this infinite space by a finite
set Gn. We impose β1 ≥ β2 ≥ . . . ≥ βn and let the desired power of the first n− 1 voters be an
integral multiple of s = 0.01; the desired power of the n-th voter follows from the sum condition.
We refer toGn as our grid of target vectors and to each β ∈ Gn as a grid point.16 Table 5 reports
key statistics for the distribution of unavoidable deviations from the ideal vectors in the d1 and
d∞-metrics: its median, average, 10%, 5%, and 1%-percentile. The deviation figures are based
on the enumerated exact solutions in W for n ≤ 7 and approximations thereof for larger n. For
instance, the number 0.01077 for n = 5 in the right-most column indicates that for 1% of the
considered 46262 different target vectors β one can obtain a distance d∞(β,B(v
∗∗∗)) ≤ 0.011,
and the remaining 99% target vectors can only be approximated less well within W . A number
of grid points in parentheses indicates the size of the considered random sample whenever only
a subset of all grid points could be dealt with. The deviation statistics in the corresponding
rows (in light color) involve a sample error in addition to the small error of using a conventional
local hill-climbing algorithm instead of global optimization in W . For example, the number
0.0011 for n = 15 in the third column indicates that half of the 10000 target vectors β which
were sampled at random (with replacement) could, by some weighted voting game, be achieved
with a d1-distance of 0.0011 or less; the remaining draws resulted in target vectors for which
our search algorithm terminated with a best achievable B(v∗∗∗) further away.
#grid d1-metric d∞-metric
n points med. av. 10% 5% 1% med. av. 10% 5% 1%
2 51 0.2400 0.2451 0.0400 0.0200 0.0000 0.12000 0.12255 0.02000 0.01000 0.00000
3 884 0.2400 0.2278 0.1000 0.0667 0.0200 0.12000 0.11391 0.05000 0.03333 0.01000
4 8037 0.1600 0.1622 0.0800 0.0600 0.0400 0.07000 0.07131 0.03667 0.03000 0.01500
5 46262 0.1010 0.1135 0.0600 0.0509 0.0324 0.04000 0.04292 0.02273 0.02000 0.01077
6 189509 0.0667 0.0790 0.0400 0.0356 0.0200 0.02222 0.02630 0.01333 0.01069 0.00815
7 596763 0.0422 0.0543 0.0257 0.0213 0.0165 0.01255 0.01629 0.00762 0.00667 0.00495
8 (10000) 0.0226 0.0248 0.0154 0.0137 0.0108 0.00601 0.00661 0.00404 0.00358 0.00281
9 (10000) 0.0148 0.0161 0.0100 0.0089 0.0070 0.00357 0.00393 0.00241 0.00216 0.00169
10 (10000) 0.0097 0.0107 0.0065 0.0059 0.0046 0.00216 0.00239 0.00145 0.00129 0.00103
11 (10000) 0.0064 0.0070 0.0043 0.0038 0.0031 0.00131 0.00146 0.00088 0.00079 0.00064
12 (10000) 0.0041 0.0045 0.0028 0.0024 0.0019 0.00079 0.00088 0.00052 0.00047 0.00037
13 (10000) 0.0026 0.0029 0.0017 0.0016 0.0013 0.00047 0.00053 0.00032 0.00028 0.00023
14 (10000) 0.0016 0.0018 0.0011 0.0010 0.0008 0.00028 0.00032 0.00019 0.00017 0.00014
15 (10000) 0.0011 0.0012 0.0008 0.0007 0.0006 0.00017 0.00019 0.00012 0.00011 0.00009
16 (10000) 0.0007 0.0008 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.00011 0.00012 0.00009 0.00008 0.00007
17 (10000) 0.0006 0.0006 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.00009 0.00009 0.00007 0.00007 0.00006
18 (10000) 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.00008 0.00008 0.00006 0.00006 0.00005
19 (10000) 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.00008 0.00008 0.00006 0.00006 0.00005
20 (10000) 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.00007 0.00007 0.00006 0.00005 0.00004
Table 5: Distribution of unavoidable absolute deviations d1(β,B(v
∗∗∗)) and d∞(β,B(v
∗∗∗))
Tables 6–8 report analogous statistics for the distribution of absolute distances for the three
heuristics (considering each grid point for up to n = 20).17 A comparison of the respective
deviation statistics with those in Table 5 broadly confirm the observations that were made
16Step size s has to be chosen with care: the number of grid points can be intractably great already for small
n if s is too small. But a larger s induces a coarser grid of feasible target vectors. This becomes more and more
problematic as n increases because of the corresponding natural decrease of an individual voter’s relative power
(on average equal to 1/n). Choosing s = 0.25, for instance, would result in the four grid points (0.5, 0.25, 0.25),
(0.5, 0.5, 0), (0.75, 0.25, 0), and (1, 0, 0) for n = 3. And Gn would contain merely five grid points for any n ≥ 4:
(0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0, . . . , 0), (0.5, 0.25, 0.25, 0, . . . , 0), (0.5, 0.5, 0, . . . , 0), (0.75, 0.25, 0, . . . , 0), and (1, 0, . . . , 0).
17The computation times behind the unavoidable errors in Table 5 ranged from less than 1 s or 40m for the
n = 5 and n = 7 rows, respectively, to 14 h for the n = 8 row and 31 h for n = 20. Quite some time is spent
on approximating the exact solution of the inverse problem. Times for the heuristic in, e.g., Table 7 were only
1 s, 15 s, 50m, and 3 h, respectively. A sample of 10000 grid points represents a reasonable compromise between
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#grid d1-metric d∞-metric
n points med. av. 10% 5% 1% med. av. 10% 5% 1%
2 51 0.480 0.480 0.080 0.020 0.000 0.240 0.240 0.040 0.010 0.000
3 884 0.560 0.555 0.200 0.133 0.047 0.280 0.278 0.100 0.067 0.023
4 8037 0.440 0.509 0.200 0.153 0.080 0.210 0.249 0.083 0.063 0.033
5 46262 0.347 0.448 0.160 0.127 0.075 0.153 0.209 0.061 0.049 0.029
6 189509 0.297 0.389 0.129 0.103 0.066 0.120 0.177 0.045 0.035 0.023
7 596763 0.247 0.338 0.101 0.080 0.052 0.097 0.151 0.033 0.025 0.016
8 1527675 0.206 0.297 0.080 0.063 0.041 0.080 0.132 0.025 0.019 0.012
9 3314203 0.176 0.265 0.064 0.051 0.034 0.068 0.118 0.020 0.015 0.009
10 6292069 0.153 0.240 0.053 0.043 0.029 0.059 0.107 0.016 0.012 0.007
11 10718685 0.136 0.220 0.046 0.037 0.025 0.052 0.099 0.014 0.010 0.006
12 16713148 0.123 0.205 0.041 0.033 0.023 0.047 0.092 0.012 0.009 0.005
13 24234058 0.112 0.193 0.038 0.030 0.021 0.044 0.087 0.011 0.008 0.005
14 33097743 0.104 0.183 0.035 0.028 0.020 0.041 0.083 0.010 0.008 0.004
15 43018955 0.097 0.175 0.033 0.027 0.019 0.038 0.079 0.010 0.007 0.004
16 53662038 0.092 0.169 0.032 0.026 0.018 0.037 0.076 0.009 0.007 0.004
17 64684584 0.087 0.164 0.031 0.025 0.017 0.035 0.074 0.009 0.006 0.004
18 75772412 0.084 0.159 0.030 0.024 0.017 0.034 0.072 0.009 0.006 0.003
19 86658411 0.081 0.156 0.029 0.024 0.016 0.033 0.071 0.008 0.006 0.003
20 97132873 0.078 0.153 0.028 0.023 0.016 0.032 0.070 0.008 0.006 0.003
Table 6: Distribution of absolute deviations for the 50%-heuristic
for the very specific target vectors derived from Penrose’s square root rule in Section 5.1: the
average and each reported percentile of the avoidable deviations decrease in n. They can be
regarded as small in absolute terms, but they are sizeable in relative terms. Again the 50%-
heuristic is clearly outperformed (in the sense of first order stochastic dominance) by the q∗
and q¯-heuristics for n ≥ 3.
5.3 Analytical example
A statement which would be analogous to observation (v) in Section 5.1 cannot be deduced
on the basis of statistical information as provided by Tables 6–8. We, therefore, close our
computational investigation by studying a particularly simple analytical example. It shows
transparently that – as indicated by observation (v) – relative deviations between the considered
heuristics and globally optimal solutions need not disappear for n→∞.
Consider the desired power distribution
βn =
1
2n− 1(2, . . . , 2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1 twos
, 1)
for n ≥ 2 and choose wn = βn as all three heuristics do.18 For any quota q ∈ Ij1 = 12n−1 · (2j −
1, 2j], where 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 1 and j ∈ N, the PBI of the smallest constituency is exactly zero
and, by symmetry, the (normalized) PBI of each of the other constituencies equals 1
n−1 . For
the remaining possibilities q ∈ Ij2 = 12n−1 · (2j, 2j + 1] where 0 ≤ j ≤ n − 1, all constituencies
precision and computational effort. Raising the sample size to 100000 would, e.g, have produced the median,
average and quantile entries (0.0041, 0.0045, 0.0027, 0.0025, 0.0020) for the d1-metric and n = 12; lowering it to
1000 would have resulted in (0.0042, 0.0047, 0.0028, 0.0026, 0.0018).
18The construction is inspired by a sequence of weighted voting games to which the Penrose limit theorem does
not apply even though every voter’s relative weight vanishes as n → ∞. Namely, the sequence {( 1
2
;wn)}n∈N
belongs to the class of somewhat pathological examples alluded to on p. 3 (cf. Lindner and Owen 2007).
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#grid d1-metric d∞-metric
n points med. av. 10% 5% 1% med. av. 10% 5% 1%
2 51 0.480 0.480 0.080 0.020 0.000 0.240 0.240 0.040 0.010 0.000
3 884 0.400 0.434 0.160 0.107 0.040 0.200 0.217 0.080 0.053 0.020
4 8037 0.340 0.370 0.160 0.120 0.060 0.147 0.172 0.065 0.050 0.025
5 46262 0.280 0.312 0.133 0.107 0.062 0.113 0.138 0.052 0.040 0.023
6 189509 0.227 0.263 0.109 0.088 0.058 0.088 0.112 0.038 0.030 0.020
7 596763 0.189 0.224 0.087 0.070 0.047 0.071 0.093 0.027 0.021 0.014
8 1527675 0.158 0.192 0.066 0.053 0.035 0.056 0.079 0.020 0.015 0.010
9 3314203 0.133 0.168 0.051 0.040 0.026 0.047 0.068 0.014 0.011 0.007
10 6292069 0.114 0.148 0.039 0.030 0.019 0.039 0.060 0.011 0.008 0.005
11 10718685 0.098 0.132 0.030 0.023 0.014 0.033 0.054 0.008 0.006 0.003
12 16713148 0.086 0.120 0.024 0.017 0.010 0.029 0.049 0.006 0.004 0.002
13 24234058 0.075 0.110 0.019 0.013 0.007 0.026 0.045 0.005 0.003 0.002
14 33097743 0.068 0.102 0.016 0.011 0.005 0.023 0.042 0.004 0.003 0.001
15 43018955 0.061 0.096 0.013 0.008 0.004 0.021 0.040 0.003 0.002 0.001
16 53662038 0.056 0.091 0.011 0.007 0.003 0.019 0.038 0.003 0.002 0.001
17 64684584 0.052 0.087 0.009 0.006 0.003 0.018 0.036 0.002 0.001 0.001
18 75772412 0.049 0.083 0.008 0.005 0.002 0.017 0.035 0.002 0.001 0.000
19 86658411 0.046 0.081 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.016 0.034 0.002 0.001 0.000
20 97132873 0.044 0.078 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.015 0.033 0.002 0.001 0.000
Table 7: Distribution of absolute deviations for the q⋆-heuristic
have a PBI of 1
n
. Denoting the corresponding weighted games by vn1,j and v
n
2,j one obtains
d1
(
vn1,j , β
n
)
=
2
2n− 1 ,
d1
(
vn2,j , β
n
)
=
2
2n− 1 ·
n− 1
n
,
d∞
(
vn1,j , β
n
)
=
1
2n− 1 , and
d∞
(
vn2,j , β
n
)
=
1
2n− 1 ·
n− 1
n
.
So, independently of the quota, the ‖ · ‖1-error is 22n−1 + O
(
n−2
)
and the ‖ · ‖∞-error is
1
2n−1 +O
(
n−2
)
.
The q¯ and q∗-heuristics prescribe quotas of
q¯ =
1
2
+
1√
pin
, and
q∗ =
1
2
+
√
4n− 3
4n− 2 ,
respectively. They and q◦ = 50% fall into Ij1 and I
j
2 for infinitely many n. Thus, all three
rules render the smallest constituency a null player infinitely many times as n→∞, just as it
happened to Luxembourg in the EEC Council between 1958 and 1973, and yield the indicated
distances.
In contrast, there always exists a simple game v∗ ∈ S whose PBI attains βn exactly for
6 ≤ n ≤ 18.19 And we conjecture that this remains true for n ≥ 19. So the corresponding
distance between β and B(v∗) equals 0 independently of the considered metric. Approximation
results for complete simple games and distances for the heuristic choice of w = βn with an
“optimal” quota q that leads to vn2,j (abbreviated as q-heuristic) are summarized in Tables 9
19An example for n = 6 is given by the following set of minimal winning coalitions: {2, 4, 5, 6},
{2, 3, 4, 5}, {1, 3, 5, 6}, {1, 3, 4, 5}, {1, 2, 4, 6}, and {1, 2, 3, 5}, which attains the PBI vector 1
44
(8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 4) =
1
11
(2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1).
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#grid d1-metric d∞-metric
n points med. av. 10% 5% 1% med. av. 10% 5% 1%
2 51 0.280 0.327 0.040 0.020 0.000 0.140 0.164 0.020 0.010 0.000
3 884 0.320 0.332 0.140 0.100 0.040 0.160 0.166 0.070 0.050 0.020
4 8037 0.300 0.304 0.147 0.110 0.050 0.130 0.138 0.063 0.045 0.020
5 46262 0.250 0.263 0.132 0.100 0.060 0.101 0.111 0.050 0.040 0.023
6 189509 0.204 0.224 0.104 0.085 0.056 0.077 0.088 0.036 0.029 0.019
7 596763 0.159 0.187 0.079 0.064 0.043 0.057 0.069 0.024 0.020 0.013
8 1527675 0.120 0.155 0.058 0.047 0.033 0.041 0.055 0.017 0.013 0.009
9 3314203 0.098 0.133 0.044 0.036 0.024 0.033 0.046 0.012 0.010 0.006
10 6292069 0.079 0.115 0.033 0.026 0.018 0.026 0.039 0.009 0.007 0.004
11 10718685 0.071 0.103 0.027 0.021 0.014 0.023 0.035 0.007 0.005 0.003
12 16713148 0.058 0.092 0.021 0.016 0.010 0.018 0.030 0.005 0.004 0.002
13 24234058 0.050 0.084 0.016 0.012 0.007 0.015 0.027 0.004 0.003 0.002
14 33097743 0.045 0.078 0.014 0.010 0.006 0.014 0.025 0.003 0.002 0.001
15 43018955 0.042 0.074 0.012 0.009 0.005 0.012 0.024 0.003 0.002 0.001
16 53662038 0.039 0.070 0.011 0.007 0.004 0.011 0.022 0.002 0.002 0.001
17 64684584 0.040 0.070 0.011 0.008 0.004 0.012 0.023 0.002 0.002 0.001
18 75772412 0.037 0.067 0.009 0.007 0.003 0.011 0.022 0.002 0.001 0.001
19 86658411 0.041 0.069 0.011 0.008 0.004 0.013 0.024 0.002 0.002 0.001
20 97132873 0.038 0.067 0.010 0.007 0.003 0.012 0.023 0.002 0.001 0.001
Table 8: Distribution of absolute deviations for the q¯-heuristic
and 10.20 Since the unavoidable error in the class of simple games S (and hence of finite
intersections of weighted games v ∈ W) is zero for 6 ≤ n ≤ 18 and presumably beyond, we
consider the C-error in order to evaluate the relative performance of the q-heuristic.
Tables 9 and 10 suggest that (i) the C-error converges to a positive constant in case of the
d1-metric and (ii) this error even seems to grow without bound when the d∞-metric is used. The
key finding that relative errors fail to disappear as n grows large can be made more rigorous.
To this end, consider the sequence of weighted voting games {(qn;wn)}n∈N with
(qn;wn) = (2n− a− 4; 3, . . . , 3︸ ︷︷ ︸
a threes
, 2, . . . , 2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−a−1 twos
, 1)
for a suitable parameter a. If a is chosen equal to about 6n7 (the exact number is provided
in Lemma 2) then the d1-distance between β
n and B(qn;wn) asymptotically tends to 12n .
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The distance achieved by these specific weighted voting games provides an upper bound for
the distance achieved by the respective optimal weighted game v∗∗∗ ∈ W . The W-error of the
heuristic under the d1-metric is, therefore, asymptotically bounded from below by
lim
n→∞
∣∣∣ 22n−1 · n−1n − 12n ∣∣∣
1
2n
= 1.
So the W-error and a fortiori also the C-error stay at around 100% even as n → ∞ when
discrepancies between βn and B(v∗∗) (or B(v∗∗∗)) are evaluated by the d1-metric.
Analogously, one can choose a equal to about 2n3 and then check that the d∞-distance
between the game’s PBI and βn asymptotically tends to 1
n2
as n → ∞. This again translates
into an asymptotic lower bound for the W-error, and a fortiori the C-error; these relative errors
go to infinity at an approximately linear speed.
20We remark that we have imposed suitable equivalence classes of voters in the optimizations for n ≥ 15
in order to reduce the computational burden. Voters i and j are in the same equivalence class if v(U) =
v(U ∪ {j}\{i}) for all coalitions U with i ∈ U and j /∈ U . This is more restrictive than requiring identical PBI
values of i and j only.
21Details on the simple but tedious computations are provided in Appendix B.
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v∗ ∈ S v∗∗ ∈ C v∗∗∗ ∈ W q-heuristic
n d1 d1 d1 d1 C-error
2 0.333333 0.333333 0.333333 0.333333 0.000000
3 0.266667 0.266667 0.266667 0.266667 0.000000
4 0.214286 0.214286 0.214286 0.214286 0.000000
5 0.038647 0.158730 0.158730 0.177778 0.120000
6 0.000000 0.113636 0.113636 0.151515 0.333333
7 0.000000 0.085470 0.085470 0.131868 0.542857
8 0.000000 0.066667 0.066667 0.116667 0.750000
9 0.000000 0.064171 0.064171 0.104575 0.629630
10 0.000000 0.061042 0.061042 0.094737 0.552000
11 0.000000 0.052158 0.052158 0.086580 0.659944
12 0.000000 0.047254 0.047254 0.079710 0.686856
13 0.000000 0.042353 0.042353 0.073846 0.743590
14 0.000000 0.037037 0.037037 0.068783 0.857143
15 0.000000 0.034483†† 0.034483† 0.064368 0.866667
16 0.000000 0.033845†† 0.033845† 0.060484 0.780576
17 0.000000 0.032221†† 0.032221† 0.057041 0.770270
18 0.000000 0.030866†† 0.030866† 0.053968 0.748490
19 0.028108†† 0.028108† 0.051209 0.821862
20 0.025641†† 0.025641† 0.048718 0.900000
Table 9: Deviations from βn in the d1-metric (analytical example)
6 Conclusion
The computations which we have reported in Section 5.1 confirm that if one wants to implement
the Penrose square root rule for population data from today’s European Union, the q∗-heuristic
of S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski and, to a lesser extent, the even simpler q¯-heuristic perform
very well in absolute terms. That is, the distance between a (normalized) square root target
distribution β and the PBI B(q∗, β) is close to zero. However, the considered heuristics can still
be very far from the globally optimal solution to the inverse problem in relative terms. This
finding applies even when only weighted voting games are allowed as feasible solutions. And
it is not restricted to small voting bodies, but holds for the current number of EU members
n = 27.
The extensive computations reported in Section 5.2 confirm this observation. They provide
the first systematic evaluation of the unavoidable deviations between arbitrary target PBI power
vectors and those that are actually implementable for voting bodies with up to n = 20 members.
Numbers such as the ones reported in Table 5 can potentially be useful in order to improve
termination criteria for local search algorithms (e.g., Leech 2002a, 2003), which have been used
in applied studies. If, say, a locally optimal candidate solution for an inverse problem with
n = 11 voters has a d1-deviation from the desired vector β greater than 0.0064, then Table 5
indicates that the odds of further improvements in the class of weighted voting games are 50:50
and search presumably should continue in a different part of the game space. If, however, the
deviation is smaller than 0.0031, then the odds are rather 1:99; termination might then make
sense.
That desired PBI distributions which concentrate a major share of relative power amongst a
few voters pose problems for the considered heuristics is not surprising. After all, the derivation
of q∗ by S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski (2007) involves a technical condition (see fn. 10) from
which one can conclude that the target PBI of a single voter should approach zero at least as
fast as 1/
√
n. It is much less obvious, however, that, first, it is not sufficient to have a target
vector β without “outliers” in order to obtain a heuristic solution that is good relative to the
exact one and, second, the relative errors may get larger rather than smaller as n increases. This
emerged from the extensive numerical computations reported in Sections 5.1–5.2 and has been
formally demonstrated for a specific analytical example in Section 5.3. One might, therefore,
summarize our findings as justifying and potentially even calling for case-specific optimization
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v∗ ∈ S v∗∗ ∈ C v∗∗∗ ∈ W q-heuristic
n d∞ d∞ d∞ d∞ C-error
2 0.166667 0.166667 0.166667 0.166667 0.000000
3 0.133333 0.133333 0.133333 0.133333 0.000000
4 0.107143 0.107143 0.107143 0.107143 0.000000
5 0.019324 0.050505 0.050505 0.088889 0.760000
6 0.000000 0.034759 0.034759 0.075758 1.179487
7 0.000000 0.022624 0.022624 0.065934 1.914286
8 0.000000 0.015686 0.015686 0.058333 2.718750
9 0.000000 0.014199 0.014199 0.052288 2.682540
10 0.000000 0.008772 0.008772 0.047368 4.400000
11 0.000000 0.008282 0.008282 0.043290 4.227273
12 0.000000 0.007688 0.007688 0.039855 4.183908
13 0.000000 0.005373 0.005373 0.036923 5.871795
14 0.000000 0.005109 0.005109 0.034392 5.732143
15 0.000000 0.004628† 0.004815† 0.032184 5.954839
16 0.000000 0.003619†† 0.003619† 0.030242 7.357143
17 0.000000 0.003463†† 0.003463† 0.028520 7.235294
18 0.000000 0.003297†† 0.003297† 0.026984 7.185185
19 0.002600†† 0.002600† 0.025605 8.848225
20 0.002502†† 0.002502† 0.024359 8.737500
Table 10: Deviations from βn in the d∞-metric (analytical example)
rather than the application of a generally rather good heuristic – not only for small but even
for large voting bodies.
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Appendix A: ILP formulation for the inverse Penrose-Banzhaf
index problem
Even though stating the inverse power index problem as an optimization problem is trivial (see
(3)), coming up with an implementable formulation for finding an exact solution is not. Voting
systems are discrete objects, and so some kind of discrete optimization is needed. Exhaustive
enumeration (see Keijzer, Klos, and Zhang 2010) is limited at best to n ≤ 9 (see Table 1).
A much more tractable alternative is to describe the set of feasible binary voting systems
by integer variables and to use some of the available optimization software packages. These
allow significantly larger numbers of variables when dealing with linear rather than non-linear
(mixed) integer optimization problems. So it is unfortunate that problem (3) cannot directly be
translated into a linear problem for the Penrose-Banzhaf index.22 The “work-around”, which
has first been suggested by Kurz (2012b) and is adopted here, is to use ILP techniques in order
to merely find out whether some binary voting system v exists whose PBI vector B(v) is at
most a specified distance α apart from the target β. This feasibility problem can be solved much
more easily than the underlying minimization problem. Still, one can iteratively determine the
exact solution of (3) by varying α.
22Interestingly, one can easily linearize the analogous inverse problem for the Shapley-Shubik power index
(SSI). So even though the PBI is easier to compute than the SSI, the corresponding inverse problem is more
difficult.
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We will mostly confine our description to the case of measuring distance by the d1-metric.
Adaptations to the d′1 or d∞-metric are straightforward. They involve heterogeneous coefficients
in inequality (19) below for d′1, and neither i-subscripts in (16)–(18) nor a summation in (19)
for d∞.
The PBI vector (1, 0, . . . , 0) of a dictator has at most a d1-distance of 2 from any normalized
power distribution (summing to 1). This is in fact the worst case, and the minimal achievable
deviation α∗ must lie inside the interval [l1, u1], where l1 = 0 and u1 = 2. In each iteration
t = 1, . . . , T of the algorithm we will check whether α = (ut − lt)/2 is a feasible distance between
target β and the PBI values generated by the considered class of voting systems. If so, we set
ut+1 = α and leave lt+1 = lt unchanged; otherwise we update lt+1 = α and leave ut+1 = ut
unchanged. In each iteration the length of the interval [lt, ut] shrinks by a factor of 2. Since
the total number of swings in an n-player voting game lies between n and m
(
n
m
)
< n2n where
m =
⌊
n
2
⌋
+1 (see, e.g., Felsenthal and Machover 1998, sec. 3.3), two distinct PBI vectors differ,
both in the d1 and the d∞-metric, by at least
(
1
n2n
)2
. A finite number T of iterations are,
therefore, sufficient for obtaining a solution. More specifically, O(n) bisections on α are needed
before ut − lt ≤
(
1
n2n
)2
and further improvements become theoretically impossible.
A pseudo-code description of this bisection approach reads as follows:23
Input: desired power index vector β, class of binary voting systems Γ, metric d(·)
Output: minimum d-distance α∗ between β and PBI vectors induced by Γ
l1 = 0
u1 = 2
α∗ = 2
ε =
(
1
n2n
)2
t = 1
while ut − lt > ε
α = ut−lt2
t = t+ 1
solve feasibility problem 〈β,Γ, d(·), α〉
if v ∈ Γ such that d(B(v) − β) ≤ α exists
then
ut = d(B(v) − β), α∗ = ut
else
lt = α
end if
end while
return α∗
The feasibility problem 〈β,Γ, d(·), α〉 consists of verifying whether there exists a voting sys-
tem v ∈ Γ such that d(B(v), β) ≤ α. The following ILP formulation describes it for Γ = S
and the d1-metric. Adaptations to C or W and d′1(·) or d∞(·) involve further variables and
(modified) constraints, but are otherwise very similar:
23The description focuses on finding the minimal distance α∗. A game v∗ ∈ Γ with B(v∗) = α∗ can straight-
forwardly be obtained from the solution to the feasibility problem 〈β,Γ, d(·), α∗〉.
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xS ∈ {0, 1} ∀S ⊆ N, (7)
xS ≤ xT ∀S ⊆ T ⊆ N, (8)
x∅ = 0 (9)
xN = 1 (10)
yi,S ∈ {0, 1} ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, S ⊆ N\{i}, (11)
yi,S = xS∪{i} − xS ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, S ⊆ N\{i}, (12)
si ≥ 0 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, (13)
si =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
yi,S ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, (14)
s =
∑n
i=1
si, (15)
δi ≥ 0 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, (16)
δi ≥ si − βi · s ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, (17)
δi ≥ −si + βi · s ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, (18)∑n
i=1
δi ≤ α · s. (19)
The binary variables xS define a Boolean function v via v(S) = xS ; inequalities (7)–(10)
ensure that they represent a simple game. The binary auxiliary variables yi,S = xS∪{i} − xS
which are introduced in (11)–(12) for all i ∈ N and ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ N\{i} satisfy yi,S = 1 if and
only if coalition S is a swing for voter i, i.e., contributes 1/2n−1 to B′i(v). They are used in
order to determine the number of swings si = 2
n−1 · B′i(v) for each player i in equation (14).
The total number of swings s =
∑n
i=1 si is defined in equation (15). Based on this total
number, the individual deviation δi = |si − βi · s| from the target number of swings is captured
by inequalities (17) and (18). The feasibility of a d1-distance α is then finally checked by
introducing constraint (19). Namely, a simple game v ∈ S whose PBI has d1-distance of α or
less exists if and only if the feasible set defined by (7)–(19) is non-empty.
The answer to whether this is the case – and, as a by-product, some v ∈ S with distance
at most α – can be obtained by feeding (7)–(19) into a standard ILP software package in
the required format. We have used IBM ILOG CPLEX 12.4 and the hardware described in
Section 5.
Appendix B: Analytical PBI calculations
This appendix presents some technical details on the PBI computations for the sequence of
weighted voting games {vn}n∈N with
vn = (qn;wn) = (2n− a− 4; 3, . . . , 3︸ ︷︷ ︸
a threes
, 2, . . . , 2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−a−1 twos
, 1),
which is considered in the final paragraphs of Section 5.3. Our first lemma determines the
number of swings in vn for each voter i = 1, . . . , n, that is, the cardinality of set {S ⊆ N \
{i} : vn(S ∪ {i})− vn(S) = 1}, as a function of a and n.
Lemma 1. The numbers of swings in vn are 2n− a− 2, 2n− a− 4, and a for all voters with
weight 3, 2, and 1, respectively.
Proof. It is convenient to exploit the fact that for any v ∈ S the number of voter i’s swings in v
and in the dual game v′ ∈ S which is obtained by setting v′(S) = 1− v(S) for all S ⊆ N must
coincide. So instead of vn consider the game vn′ which involves identical weights but quota
q′ = 4 instead of 2n− a− 4. Referring to winning and losing coalitions in vn′ we have:
(i) A voter i with wi = 3 renders a losing coalition S ⊆ N \ {i} winning by joining if either
|S| = 1 or S = {j, k} with wj = 2 and wk = 1. There are n − 1 coalitions of the former
and n− a− 1 coalitions of the latter type, amounting to 2n− a− 2 swings altogether.
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(ii) A voter i with wi = 2 ⊆ N \ {i} renders a losing coalition S winning by joining if either
S = {wj} with wj = 3 or 2, or S = {j, k} with wj = 2 and wk = 1. There are a+(n−a−2)
coalitions of the former and n−a−2 coalitions of the latter type, amounting to 2n−a−4
swings altogether.
(iii) Voter n with wn = 1 renders a losing coalition S ⊆ N \ {i} winning by joining if S = {j}
with wj = 3. There are a such coalitions.
Writing ⌊x⌋ to denote the largest integer not greater than x, and x mod y to denote the
integer remainder when x is divided by y, we have the following finding for distances in the
d1-metric:
Lemma 2. Choose
a(n) =
{⌊
6n
7
⌋
if n mod 7 ∈ {1, 2, 3},⌊
6n
7
⌋− 1 if n mod 7 ∈ {0, 4, 5, 6},
and consider
vn = (2n− a− 4; 3, . . . , 3︸ ︷︷ ︸
a(n) threes
, 2, . . . , 2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−a(n)−1 twos
, 1).
Then
lim
n→∞
n · (d1(B(vn), βn)) = 1
2
.
Proof. Suppose that n mod 7 = 0, i.e., n = 7k + 0 for some k ∈ N. Then a = 6k − 1 and
Lemma 1 yields swing numbers of 2 · 7k− (6k− 1)− 2, 2 · 7k− (6k− 1)− 4, and 6k− 1 for the
three voter types, respectively. This implies a total number of
(6k − 1)(8k − 1) + (n− 6k)(8k − 3) + (6k − 1) = 56k2 − 11k
swings, and hence a PBI vector of
B(v7k) =
1
56k2 − 11k

8k − 1, . . . , 8k − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
6k−1 times
, 8k − 3, . . . , 8k − 3︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
, 6k − 1

 .
This yields
Bi(v
7k)− β7ki =


− 1(14k−1)k(56k−11) if wi = 3,
28k−3
(14k−1)k(56k−11) if wi = 2,
− 28k2−9k+1(14k−1)k(56k−11) if wi = 1,
and summing the absolute values of these figures up for the 6k − 1 voters with weight 3, the k
voters with weight 2, and the final voter n one obtains
‖Bi(vn)− βn‖1 = 2(28k − 3)
(14k − 1)k(56k − 11)
in case of n = 7k. This number and results of the similarly tedious computations when
n mod 7 = 1, . . . , 6 are summarized in Table 11. For each of the seven cases one easily sees that
the deviations tend to 114k , which is equivalent to
1
2n .
In case of the d∞-metric, choose
a(n) = ⌊(n+ 1)/3⌋+ ⌊n/3⌋ − 1.
In each corresponding game vn (see Lemma 2) roughly two thirds of the players have weight 3
each, roughly one third have weight 2, and a single player has weight 1. The games vn result
in very good solutions of the inverse problem for n < 8 and the best ones we could find for
n ≥ 8. Using this in order to obtain an upper bound one can verify the following result in
perfect analogy to Lemma 2:
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n = Bi(v
n)− βi for ‖B(vn)− β‖17k+ wi = 3 wi = 2 wi = 1
0 − 1(14k−1)k(56k−11) 28k−3(14k−1)k(56k−11) − 28k
2−9k+1
(14k−1)k(56k−11)
2(28k−3)
(14k−1)k(56k−11)
1 0 12k(14k+1) − 12(14k+1) 114k+1
2 1(14k+3)(56k2+19k+2)
7(4k+1)
(14k+3)(56k2+19k+2) − 28k
2+13k+1
(14k+3)(56k2+19k+2)
2(28k2+13k+1)
(14k+3)(56k2+19k+2)
3 1(14k+5)(28k2+17k+3)
2(7k+3)
(14k+5)(28k2+17k+3) − 2(7k
2+6k+1)
(14k+5)(28k2+17k+3)
4(7k2+6k+1)
(14k+5)(28k2+17k+3)
4 − 17(2k+1)(14k2+14k+3) 14k+514(2k+1)(14k2+14k+3) − 14k
2+7k+1
14(2k+1)(14k2+14k+3)
14k2+19k+5
7(2k+1)(14k2+14k+3)
5 − 3(14k+9)(56k2+71k+21) 28k+15(14k+9)(56k2+71k+21) − 28k
2+25k+6
(14k+9)(56k2+71k+21)
2(28k2+43k+15)
(14k+9)(56k2+71k+21)
6 − 1(14k+11)(28k2+43k+16) 2(7k+5)(14k+11)(28k2+43k+16) − 2(7k
2+9k+3)
(14k+11)(28k2+43k+16)
4(7k2+12k+5)
(14k+11)(28k2+43k+16)
Table 11: d1-distances between β
n and PBI of game vn ∈ W in Lemma 2 (with k ∈ N)
Lemma 3. The weighted voting game v∗∗∗ ∈ W whose PBI minimizes d∞-distance to βn sat-
isfies
d∞(v
∗∗∗, βn) ≤ b(n) =


8n−9
n(4n−7)(2n−1) if n mod 3 = 0,
8n−23
(4n2−5n−8)(2n−1) if n mod 3 = 1,
4
4n2−1 if n mod 3 = 2
for n ≥ 8.
Note that the indicated bound tends to 1
n2
, i.e., limn→∞ b(n)
/
1
n2
= 1.
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